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Abstract— The evolution of smart automobiles and vehicles 
within the Internet of Things (IoT) - particularly as that evolution 
leads toward a proliferation of completely autonomous vehicles - 
has sparked considerable interest in the subject of 
vehicle/automotive security. While the attack surface is wide, there 
are patterns of exploitable vulnerabilities. In this study we 
reviewed, classified according to their attack surface and 
evaluated some of the common vehicle and infrastructure attack 
vectors identified in the literature. To remediate these attack 
vectors, specific technical recommendations have been provided 
as a way towards secure deployments of smart automobiles and 
transportation infrastructures.  
Keywords— Automotive cybersecurity, IoT, Autonomous cars, 
attack vectors, vulnerabilities. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there has been an exponential growth in 
complex electronic computer control systems for vehicles, 
which has been particularly evident in the evolution of ‘smart 
cars’ and even more so in the rise of ‘autonomous vehicles’ – 
i.e., those that can accelerate, steer, brake, and navigate  without 
human input.  These are vehicles of all sizes, from passenger 
cars and buses to trucks that have also become a growing area 
of interest within the context of the Internet of Things (IoT). 
Business forecasts predict a high degree of interest in  IoT 
connected cars, creating the "Internet of vehicles" and a new 
transportation environment of driverless cars  [1] [2]. 
Automobiles are a complex collection of mechanical and 
electrical systems and devices and have been so since their 
inception. In response to competition, changing  customer needs 
and regulatory requirements, improvements to these systems 
have been continuous throughout the automobile’s history. 
Many of the improvements included technologies invented 
specifically for the automobile, while others were originally 
created for other purposes but quickly found uses within the 
automotive realm. For example, the transistor and the junction 
type transistor were first demonstrated in 1947 and 1951 
respectively. [3]  By 1963,  transistorized breaker-less ignition, 
using transistors instead of contact points for building/collapsing 
the magnetic coil field so as to induce sparks to the spark plugs, 
could be found as an option from two U.S. carmakers on select 
models, and available from at least 12 different aftermarket 
suppliers [4]. Even before that, in 1958, the integrated circuit 
(IC) was developed, containing multiple transistors [5]. By the 
early 1970’s integrated circuits had become a staple of 
mainstream production automotive applications, controlling 
spark function in units such as the High Energy Ignition (HEI) 
modules from General Motors (GM). By the early 1980’s 
computers had moved into the automotive arena with the Engine 
Control Unit (ECU) [6], a component  interfacing with  fuel and 
ignition systems along with a variety of sensors to receive  
feedback and make instantaneous engine control decisions such 
as air/fuel ratio and spark timing.  ECU’s are found now in every 
car, although today they use sophisticated computers to control 
steering, braking, climate control, navigation, infotainment, and 
much more [6].  
The motivation behind this paper is to review landmark 
exploits in the area of automobile computer controls and 
supporting road infrastructure. Along with the  physical security 
considerations, the new era of automobiles as part of the IoT, 
depends heavily on software, increasing the problem complexity 
and widening the possible attack vector beyond traditional, 
physical access boundaries. The dependence on software is 
significant, with the average modern high-end car containing 
over 100 million lines of code [6].  Through the exploration of 
known, past exploits, we hope to cover some interesting 
technologies, evaluate their use and identify their risks. This area 
of study becomes more complex given the realization that cars 
today are not only controlled by computers but are becoming 
networked not just internally with  their own components, but 
also externally to other cars through vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) 
networks and to the surrounding infrastructure of roadways, 
traffic control devices, signage, etc. in a vehicle-to-infrastructure 
(V2I) network environment. Considering the possibility of 
exploiting a security vulnerability in this landscape complicates 
the issues and affects everyone in the supply chain, from the 
manufacturer to the driver, along with non-autonomous vehicle 
drivers and pedestrians.  
In this study we embark on providing a brief overview of the 
environment, present some of the most well-known attack 
vectors, and propose a set of technical recommendations for the 
secure and safe deployment of smart cars within smart 
infrastructures. 
II. THE ENVIRONMENT 
In determining the attack vectors of autonomous vehicles, it 
is important to consider the inherent connectivity within the 
environment. Autonomous vehicles establish and maintain both 
internal and external connections. Internally, vehicles are 
connected with their own components such as a Tire Pressure 
Monitoring System (TPMS) or driver devices such as key fobs 
and mobile phones. Externally, vehicles could be connected to 
other vehicles forming V2V ad hoc networks, roadway 
infrastructure, forming vehicle-to-infrastructure V2I ad hoc 
networks and manufacturer’s assistance platforms (e.g. On-
Star). The types of connections are very diverse, ranging from 
Bluetooth, WiFi, near field communication (NFC), and global 
system of mobile communications (GSM) cellular protocols [7] 
to ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio band transmissions [8].  
The high connectivity of autonomous vehicles, combined 
with the diversity of connected components make them an 
attractive target for vulnerability exploitation.  
A. Attack Vector: “Lock Picking” 
Keyless door entry allows users to open and lock car doors 
using a key fob with buttons that wirelessly transmit ‘open’ and 
‘lock’ signals. The exploit is based on a man-in-the-middle 
attack using a device that captures the transmitted signal from 
the key fob and simultaneously sends a jamming signal on the 
same frequency. The key fob user, thinking their key fob 
malfunctioned, tries again; this time the car door unlocks. Key 
fobs transmit unique, one-time codes each time they are used.  
The attacker’s device captured the first code, then transmits and 
“sacrifices” it to unlock the door as it captures the second code 
transmission. As the codes have no expiration time, the attacker 
may use the second captured code to transmit and open the door. 
The same technique and device may also be used to attack 
garage door openers [9].   
These types of attacks have been successfully demonstrated  
on garage door openers and several cars including Chrysler, 
Daewoo, Fiat, GM, Honda, Toyota, Volvo, Volkswagen, and 
Jaguar [10].  The work behind these types of attacks can be 
explained mathematically [11] while several hardware devices 
exist to carry out these types of attacks. For example, the 
Rolljam device to attack remotely operated RF signals is small 
and fast, OpenSesame opens garage doors using a Mattel toy, 
OwnStar finds, unlocks, and starts GM OnStar cars.  
The same technology has also been used in the amateur 
drone space with SkyJack, a Raspberry Pi drone that locates and 
attacks other drones [12]. These devices are widely available in 
the market, so much so that complaints were made about them 
to the UK’s Home Office (the government’s department charged 
with national security) but their sales continued unabated [13].    
 Protecting against these types of attacks could be 
addressed by the remote door control system manufacturers. 
Possible solutions could include the implementation of anti-
jamming and code-grabbing resistant functions, along with 
updated chip firmware with time-expiring signals. The latter 
solution has been adopted by one manufacturer [14] but others 
have not yet followed suit.  
B. Attack Vector: Vehicle-Monitoring Components 
A well-studied exploitation has been related to the tire 
pressure monitoring system (TPMS) [8]. The TPMS transmits 
information to the vehicle’s Electronic Control Unit (ECU), 
while continuously monitoring tire pressure to enable the ECU 
to trigger a dashboard warning light (in some vehicles the actual 
tire pressure is displayed) if tire pressure falls outside 
specifications. These systems are known to have been deployed 
without any security safeguards.  
A possible passive attack can allow attackers to track vehicle 
movement and location using mobile or roadside tracking 
stations as TPMS signals can be captured up to 40 meters away 
from the vehicle. On the other hand, the lack of cryptographic 
protection of the TPS signals can enable an active attack as the 
vehicle’s ECU trusts any information provided from vehicle 
sensors. It is therefore possible to wirelessly inject spoofed 
signals, tricking the ECU into displaying false and even out of 
range tire pressure measurements. Mitigating these types of 
attacks can be as simple as using hardware pairings (e.g. ECU 
communication with sensors of specified hardware addresses) 
and deploying encrypted-only signal transmissions.  
C. Attack Vector: Road. Infrastructure 
As vehicles become more connected, road infrastructure 
components become an intrinsic part of these growing 
transportation computing networks. In fact, vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I) connectivity becomes an integral part of the 
environment which includes smart traffic lights, pedestrian 
crosswalk sensors and smart road, adaptive road signs.   
Exploiting vulnerabilities of road signs to alter the displayed 
messages may sound more like an innocent prank but it can 
quickly become a very serious issue. Case in point, a 2014 attack 
when a foreign national initially compromised five overhead 
highway signs in North Carolina and six others in two other 
states, altering their displays by indicating they were hacked by 
SunHacker [15]. The attack was possible due to the negligence 
of the signal operators in changing the default password set by 
the sign manufacturer. [16]  
Though individual road signs have been compromised and 
changed to warn of zombie attacks and other farcical threats, this 
is the first known case of a mass compromise of networked road 
signs. While the particular attack was benign, it is clear that 
compromised road infrastructure by a malicious actor with 
control over highway signage could cause major problems that 
may be more than traffic disruptions, particularly during an 
emergency.  
 Mitigating this type of attack requires following best 
practices in password management for the road signs as one 
would expect for any other computing devise that is shipped 
with a default password from the manufacturer. The 
demonstrated attacks provided misinformation to drivers but it 
is easy to extrapolate how misleading information could be 
passed to vehicles through their sensor payload from road 
infrastructure assets.   
From the vehicle’s perspective protection has to come from 
secure design of sensors that provide both V2V and V2I sensing 
related to speed, motion, and detection of road and traffic 
conditions.  Each one of these sensors represents a potential 
attack vector, so secure design should be a consideration not 
only in deployment but also in sensor design. There are different 
approaches in sensor design to mitigate attacks. For example, 
developing smart sensors that use linear Gaussian dynamics 
techniques that are able to statistically profile expected sensor 
inputs and detect attacks [17]. 
D. Attack Vector: Remote Attacks 
A widely known automotive attack was against a Jeep 
Cherokee [18]. The remote, internet-based attack was executed 
by exploiting a vulnerability found in the vehicle’s 
entertainment system. The attacker was able to take control 
away from the driver and operate steering, brakes, and 
transmission controls as well as dashboard features and the 
vehicle’s GPS system. The attack was based on exploiting 
Chrysler’s smart phone application Uconnect. Once the car’s IP 
address was captured, the vehicle became vulnerable via an 
Internet connection, requiring no physical connection or access. 
The root-cause of the vulnerability was based on the inherent 
weakness of the vehicle’s wireless access point which was 
vulnerable to a password-guessing and brute force attack [19]. 
The attack prompted a 1.4 million vehicle recall in order to 
install a necessary software patch.  
Another well-documented attack involves Nissan’s electric 
car, the Leaf. Similar to the Jeep attack, the vulnerability was 
based on the vehicle’s ability to be remotely accessed via a cell-
phone using  an application called NissanConnect EV (formerly 
known as CarWings) [20]. The vulnerability allowed an attacker 
to access not just one vehicle’s battery status information and to 
control the heating and air conditioning system, but also to 
connect to other Leaf vehicles, around the world, using Vehicle 
Identification Numbers (VINs). Nissan responded to reports of 
this hack by quickly deactivating the application [21].   
While these examples reveal serious remote access 
vulnerabilities, another car manufacturer, Tesla, seems to be less 
vulnerable to attacks, despite their significant dependence on 
software. While attackers have demonstrated an ability to  
connect to a Tesla  and perform some functions, they had to 
overcome extensive security blocks, and they were able to 
succeed only through physical access and extensive physical 
tear-down to access necessary parts to compromise and gain 
control [22]. 
E. Attack Vector: Vehicle Architecure Vulnerabilities 
A potential area for attacks in today’s automobiles   is the 
Controller Area Network (CAN) bus architecture used for the 
connection of vehicle internal components. Early automobiles 
used point-to-point wired connections until it became apparent 
that as car features and complexity grew (i.e., as cars became 
ECU-equipped) the amount of wiring required to continue 
connecting each component would become unwieldy and hard 
to maintain.  
In 1985 an alternative architecture for automobile internal 
connectivity was developed, resembling the bus connectivity 
commonly used in personal computers [23]. The CAN bus 
architecture greatly reduced the amount of wiring for a vehicle 
and  has been required to be deployed in automobiles since 2008 
[24].  
Modern automobiles tend to have two CAN buses, one 
providing low-speed and another high-speed communication. 
The low-speed bus controls and carries less critical systems and 
components such as heating and air conditioning, radio, theft 
deterrent modules and TPMS signals. The high-speed bus (the 
more trusted of the two in its network implementation) controls 
critical engine, powertrain, and braking system components.  
These two networks are supposed to have strong connections 
and gateways between them. The gateways are only to be 
reprogrammable via the high-speed bus, ensuring a higher 
degree of protection that the less-trusted low-speed bus network. 
Attached to both of those buses are the body control and the 
telematics modules that are used for remote manufacturer 
access, such as GM’s OnStar systems.  
Within the CAN architecture, broadcast messages are sent 
on the network and each device “decides” if the message is 
relevant to it or not.  
 
Fig. 1. The introduction of the Controller Area Network bus architecture 
(right) significantly simplified traditional architectures (left) by 
eliminating the point-to-point connection of all communicating devices 
and the ECU (Image credit: National Instrument [23]) 
However, while the technology is efficient in terms of 
reducing wiring complexity, it was designed to be lightweight, 
but not designed to segment the network and isolate components 
or to create boundary defenses. Given the centralized nature of 
the architecture, everything is connecting to the ECU [6]; once 
an attacker gains access to one part of the system, they are able 
to access and attack all other systems.  
Another inherent weakness to the CAN architecture is the 
lack of device authorization, as there is no way to confirm that 
transmitted information originates from the actual device. In 
addition, the traffic within the CAN is unencrypted, thereby 
making message transmission visible once intercepted.   
The best approach to remediate this inherent vulnerability is 
encrypting messages transmitted within the CAN and several 
such solutions exist such as SecureCAN which uses a three-pass 
algorithm of substitution, transposition, and time-multiplexing 
[6] and code obfuscation and encryption over the standardized 
On-Board Diagnostics II (OBD-II) interface with the ECU [25]. 
Device authentication can also be accomplished by designing 
device controllers that trust a specified list of known providers. 
Coupled with encrypted messaging the danger of a spoof attack 
is minimized.  
One interesting study that was conducted in both laboratory 
and field settings, was to determine the security implications if 
there were to be a malicious attack on a vehicle’s connected 
systems [26].   The result of this study was the identification of 
two primary vectors as prospective ways to launch a malicious 
attack. The first way is by accessing the physical On-Board 
Diagnostic II (OBD-II) port which is required for emissions 
testing and the second way is by accessing any available 
wireless interfaces.  In the study, it was demonstrated how 
different exploits could be launched by connecting a laptop to 
the vehicle’s OBD-II port. Exploiting CAN weaknesses, several 
systems and components were attacked. A particularly 
impressive attack included reflashing (i.e. reprogramming)  the 
ECU’s while driving, which should not be able to occur since 
ECUs are supposed to reject reflashing efforts whenever the 
engine is running. The result is that the car’s engine stops 
running.  
Several other attacks have been successfully demonstrated, such 
as programming the telematics unit via the low-speed CAN bus. 
This bus lacks authenticator fields, has weak access controls and 
message transmission is based on a broadcasting protocol, 
making it susceptible to Denial of Service (DOS) and other types 
of attacks [26].  
Using the described inherent weaknesses, it was possible to 
demonstrate ECU reflashing,  fuzzing (i.e. sending random 
unknown or partially known packets) to attack and confuse, 
study the system responses and be able to “reverse engineer” by 
observing how the system was handling various message.    
In Table 1, there is a summary of some of the demonstrated 
exploits using this methodology and in particular CarShark, a 
custom-made CAN bus sniffer and packet injection software 
tool.  
TABLE I.  SUMMARY OF EXPLOITS AGAINST THE CONTROLLER AREA 
NETWORK (CAN) BUS.  
Vulnerability Attack Type Result 
Unauthorized 
access 
Packet injection. 
Reflashing ECU 
while driving. 
Engine stopped. 
Code loaded into vehicles’ 
telematics unit. 
Unauthorized 
access 
Denial of 
Service 
Packet injection to 
Body Control 
Module (BCM). 
Fuzzing. 
Door lock relay activated. 
Wipers turned on/forced off. 
Trunk opened.  
Horn activated. 
Auto-headlight control 
deactivated. 
Use of washer fluid. 
Brake/auxiliary lights rendered 
inoperable. 
Unauthorized 
access 
Packet injection to 
Engine Control 
Module (ECM) 
Engine timing and RPM 
disturbed.  
Engine cylinders stopped. 
Grind starter motor  
Unauthorized 
access 
Packet injection to 
Brake Control 
Module (BCM) 
Brake application and release 
(evenly or unevenly) 
 at speeds below 5 mph. 
Denial of 
Service 
Packet injection to 
other CAN-
connected bus 
devices. 
Disable CAN bus 
communication. 
Freeze instrument panel status. 
Unauthorized 
access Packet injection 
Kill engine 
 
Arguably, the CAN-based exploits may be unsettling 
although they were all the result of physical connections to the 
OBD-II link and required a full laptop computer within the 
victim’s car to be able to seize control of the various automotive 
components.  It would be reasonable to consider though that the 
physical laptop connection to the OBD-II could be replaced by 
a small form factor computer with wireless capability that could 
be easily concealed, opening the possibility for a remote 
network attack unbeknownst to the driver.  
III. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The   attack vectors described in the literature seem to apply 
equally to conventional smart cars and those featuring 
completely autonomous control. Both vehicle types share some 
type of an OBD diagnostic interface, similar CAN bus 
architecture, similar network connectivity using WiFi over 
known Internet protocols.  They also already include or assume 
to be utilizing extensive sensory inputs from other vehicles and 
the surrounding road infrastructure. This connectivity increases 
the complexity of automotive systems, while also increasing 
their attack surfaces.  
Despite the prevalence of smart vehicles and the numerous 
possible attack vectors identified and demonstrated in the 
literature for automobile systems in general, there is a distinct 
absence of real, malicious and successful attacks. Perhaps the 
reason is how expensive vehicles are, making them hard to be 
taken apart to better understand how they work and find 
potential vulnerabilities. Another explanation is the relative 
immaturity of roadway infrastructure to support large-scale 
adoption of smart vehicles and V2I connectivity and the even 
more limited communication capabilities across vehicles, 
rendering V2V an aspiration. This inherent immaturity and 
widespread adoption may be an opportunity for expert groups, 
lawmakers, manufacturers, engineers, software designers, and 
other involved stakeholders to better understand, design and 
implement technologies with security as a design feature. In 
general, the following recommendations could serve as a non-
exhaustive account of remediations that would significantly 
reduce the inherent attack vectors in for automotive security: 
• Secure sensor design. Secure sensor design to support 
autonomous vehicles are crucial to the function of these 
systems and present a current challenge and an 
opportunity.  Innovative, cautious design that includes 
security mechanisms that preserve the authenticity of 
measurements by blocking injection attacks, ensure the 
identity of the source by preventing spoofing and safely 
transmit information (i.e. using encryption) within the 
vehicles and during  communication with the environment 
will serve to reduce risks and attack vectors.  
• Secure control device design. The cases of the code-
grabbing devices that capture and exploit signals from key-
fob transmission present a low-level risk that can be easily 
mitigated using both code expiration timestamps and 
source method authentication and pairing. To 
contextualize the sophistication and severity of this attack 
vector, they are equivalent to the use of a bent metal coat-
hanger or the flattened “Slim Jim” tools widely sold at 
automotive supply stores 50 years ago. Both these legacy 
hand tools and today’s code-grabbers perform the same 
task, gaining unauthorized car entry. 
• Authenticated, encrypted access to vehicle resources. 
Both conventional and smart vehicles provide methods to 
perform deep (e.g. engine performance, timing) and 
shallow (e.g. tire pressure, cabin temperature) diagnostic 
checks either by physical or remote connection. In either 
case, access should be authenticated and the transmission 
of any information must be encrypted.  
• Authenticated, encrypted access to vehicle services.  
Access to GPS, road assistance or even the vehicles’ 
entertainment system should be authenticated and the 
transmission of any information must be encrypted.  
• Secure road Infrastructure design. Road infrastructure 
should follow best practices in the design of computer and 
network-based services, adhering to the principles of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability.   
• Paired, encrypted V2I communication. Similar to cellular 
network communication that pairing and encrypted 
communication with cellular towers is based on a uniquely 
identifiable and traceable pairing of devices and antennas, 
vehicles should establish a similar type of connection with 
infrastructure assets. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Smart cars, particularly those of the imminently pending 
autonomous generation, hold the promise of making human 
lives easier and freeing our time for more productive endeavors. 
Moreover, they hold promise for dramatically reducing lost lives 
from traffic accidents resulting from the human proclivity for 
inattention and from our inherent lack of knowledge (i.e., 
inability to see far enough ahead to accurately predict pending 
collisions).  
Computer controls using networked vehicles and 
infrastructures, far-reaching sensors, rapid and accurate decision 
making, and continuous attention to the task can virtually 
eliminate the risks inherent in human control of automobiles and 
other vehicles. While the prospect of human error is likely to 
remain as a continuous issue going forward, having a more 
clearly defined single set of best practices as they relate to the 
design and implementation of smart/autonomous vehicles and 
roadway infrastructure, along with a program of continuous 
training to help confirm compliance, will go a long way toward 
the mitigation of risk.  The challenge will be to have in place a 
coherent set of standards and best practices and established well 
in advance of implementation, to minimize risk of hacking and 
the resultant damage to life and property from those who would 
do harm. Automotive cybersecurity is a relatively new topic and 
an emerging technology and will require much additional study 
As with any technology, there are clearly risks associated 
with automotive and vehicle attacks, especially as cars become 
nodes of the IoT.  The risk severity ranges from innocuous to 
potentially severe. A concerted effort between industry and 
government stakeholders to ensure the establishment and 
compliance to standard processes and best practices will do a lot 
towards reducing risks.  
It has been very refreshing to see the automobile industry’s 
approach to dealing with the security considerations of vehicles 
in this new era.  Several automakers, in recognition of the 
complexity of the problem and to protect their brand and 
customers, have been very receptive about potential 
vulnerabilities.  GM,  Fiat/Chrysler and Tesla have gone as far 
as establishing bug bounty programs [27] [28] [29] that invite 
the reporting of vulnerabilities from the public while offering 
immunity from liability, monetary awards and public 
recognition, to those that discover vulnerability in their products.  
This is a very clever approach from the automakers, essentially 
recruiting a multitude of testers that can help improve vehicle 
security. 
Real change, though, will rest in finding ways to ensure that 
both vehicles and the supporting infrastructure are thoughtfully 
designed to minimize risk before they become available for use.  
In this paper we described a number of recommendations 
that may serve as inspiration for future work. It would be amiss 
to omit the need for policy development and legal requirements 
to support this new era of transportation.  Securing vehicles and 
infrastructure will require extensive new or innovative designs 
in every aspect, which in turn, will require investments that 
manufactures may be reluctant to make unless they are required 
to do so. There are also issues of privacy given the amount of 
connected information that is being generated and distributed 
within this new generation of automotive networks and IoT. 
Therefore, it is necessary to examine and devise the legal rules, 
standards and frameworks that address all these issues that are 
beyond the scope in this study. 
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